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By the time of Heraclitus, criticism of one’s predecessors and contemporaries 
had long been an established literary tradition. It had been successfully prac­
ticed since Hesiod by many poets and prose writers.1 No one, however, practiced 
criticism in the form of persistent and methodical attacks on both previous and 
current intellectual traditions as effectively as Heraclitus. Indeed, his biting criti­
cism was a part of his philosophical method and, on an even deeper level, of 
his self­appraisal and self­understanding, since he alone pretended to know the 
correct way to understand the underlying reality, unattainable even for the wisest 
men of Greece. Of all the celebrities figuring in Heraclitus’ fragments only Bias, 
one of the Seven Sages, is mentioned approvingly (DK 22 B 39), while another 
Sage, Thales, is the only one mentioned neutrally, as an astronomer (DK 22 B 38). 
All the others named by Heraclitus, which is to say the three most famous poets, 
Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus, the philosophical poet Xenophanes, Pythago­
ras, widely known for his manifold wisdom, and finally, the historian and geog­
rapher Hecataeus – are given their share of opprobrium.2
Despite all the intensity of Heraclitus’ attacks on these famous individuals, 
one cannot say that there was much personal in them. He was not engaged in ordi­
nary polemics with his contemporaries, as for example Xenophanes, Simonides 
or Pindar were.3 Xenophanes and Hecataeus, who were alive when his book was 
written, appear only once in his fragments, and even then only in the company of 
two more famous people, Hesiod and Pythagoras (DK 22 B 40). His fundamental 
complaints were directed against illustrious men of the distant and recent past, 
and in those cases where the grounds for those complaints are formulated or at 
least reconstructable, they are of a predominantly philosophical, or to be more 
precise, epistemological character. Heraclitus tries to assure his readers that he 
knows the truth which the others only pretend to know. From such a point of view 
it is quite natural that his main targets were Homer and Hesiod, known as the 
teachers of Greece. Both poets are mentioned three times, though Homer once in 
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B 105). In fragment DK 22 B 56 an epistemological charge can be very clearly iden­
tified: “Men are mistaken as regards the knowledge of the visible things, in the 
same way as Homer, who was wiser than all the Greeks”.4 In spite of being the 
wisest of the Greeks, Homer still lacks the insight needed to apprehend reality, 
for he was not even able to solve a riddle posed to him by children. Thus, his 
wisdom is only seeming.5 Criticism of the same kind is directed against Hesiod 
in fragment DK 22 B 57. He is the teacher of most people and they are sure that he 
knew most things, yet he did not recognize that day and night are one. Indeed, 
Hesiod was unaware of Heraclitus’ doctrine on the unity of the opposing powers, 
so his pretensions to be a master of truth are shallow.6 There is also a similar frag­
ment on lucky and unlucky days (DK 22 B 106), though in this case it is not clear 
whether Hesiod was in fact mentioned by Heraclitus.7 If he was, this does not add 
anything substantial to his portrait by Heraclitus; if he was not, this reduces his 
presence from three to two fragments.
In the last case it turns out that the main object of Heraclitus’ attacks was 
Pythagoras, for he appears in three fragments, once with the other polymaths, 
and twice as the sole object of criticism. The force and variety of Heraclitus’ 
attacks on Pythagoras demonstrates that he possibly saw him as being his chief 
rival in pretensions to wisdom. Since Pythagoras lived in Croton in southern Italy 
and did not leave any writing behind, his fame by the time of his death (ca. 490­s) 
must have been so well established and widely spread that in Heraclitus’ eyes he 
could easily compete with the greatest Greek poets and teachers. But precisely 
because Pythagoras wrote nothing, we know far less about his activities than 
about Hesiod, Xenophanes and Hecataeus. Heraclitus probably knew more about 
Pythagoras, but in order to understand him we need to compare his words with 
what we know about Pythagoras, and this is quite problematic. The wide variety 
of interpretations produced in the last century arises not so much from the con­
stantly changing views on Heraclitus as from the changing views on Pythagoras. 
One of the trends is to replace an old image of Pythagoras the philosopher and 
scientist with a purely religious figure, whose reflection must be found in Her­
aclitus’ text. Another difficulty is that our three fragments contain an unusual 
concentration of words which are either coined by Heraclitus himself, such as 
πολυμαθίη, and possibly κακοτεχνίη, or appear for the first time in his book, 
4 Unless otherwise stated, translations are my own.
5 Marcovich 1967/2001, 81–83; Babut 1976, 469–474; Kahn 1979, 111–112.
6 Babut 1976, 480–481.
7 Marcovich 1967/2001, 321; cf. Babut 1976, 482–486.
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such as ἱστορίη, συγγραφαί and κοπίδες. All this widens the spectrum of possible 
interpretations, though luckily it does not make it endlessly extendable.
Let me start with the shortest of these fragments, DK 22 B 81, in which Her­
aclitus calls Pythagoras κοπίδων ἀρχηγός. This is rendered either as ‘chief of 
swindlers’8 or as ‘originator, ancestor of swindles’,9 because the genitive plural 
κοπίδων can be regarded as derived either from κόπις or from κοπίς. Κόπις denoted 
a speaker who could sway an audience with artful, but deceitful words. Euripides 
calls Odysseus ὁ ποικιλόφρων κόπις ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστὴς Λαερτιάδης (Hec. 
131 f.). In the Byzantine dictionaries κόπις is explained as ὁ λαλός, ὁ ῥήτωρ (Suda) 
or as ὁ δημοκόπος καὶ κόβαλος (Etym. Gudian.). If κοπίδων refers to such people, 
then Heraclitus would have had in mind both Pythagoras, as an arch­cheater, and 
the Pythagoreans, who also deceived people with their mendacious speeches, the 
‘teachers of lies’.10 This is possible, although a reference to Pythagoras coupled 
with Pythagoreans would be unique in the fifth century. Besides, there is no 
evidence that the Pythagoreans were renowned as powerful speakers, although 
Pythagoras certainly was.
On the other hand, the word κοπίδες, the plural of κοπίς (a kind of knife) 
refers not to liars themselves, but to their deceitful speeches: κοπίδας δὲ τὰς τῶν 
λόγων τέχνας.11 This is how I think both sources of fragment DK 22 B 81 under­
stood κοπίδων. Philodemus in the Rhetoric, quoting Heraclitus, calls rhetoric 
(and not Pythagoras!) κοπίδων ἀρχηγός, i. e. either “the originator of swindles” 
or “chief of swindlers”. Timaeus of Tauromenium, defending Pythagoras, makes 
the first variant more plausible, for he says: thus, it appears that not Pythago­
ras was the inventor of real swindles (ὥστε καὶ φαίνεσθαι μὴ τὸν Πυθαγόραν 
εὑρ<ετὴν γεν>όμενον τῶν ἀληθινῶν κοπίδων) but his accuser Heraclitus was the 
liar (FGrHist 566 F  132 =  DK  22 B  81)! A Hellenistic pseudo­Pythagorean tradi­
tion reacted to this debate by producing Pythagoras’ own book Κοπίδες.12 All this 
imparts more plausibility to the interpretation, shared by H. Diels and other schol­
ars, which makes Pythagoras the sole target of Heraclitus: ‘originator, ancestor of 
swindles’.13 Marcovich’s objection that there were liars long before Pythagoras, 
8 Burkert 1972, 161; Kahn 1979, 41: “prince of impostors”; Marcovich 1967/2001, 72: “chief captain 
of cheaters”.
9 DK: “Ahnherr der Schwindeleien (Schwindler)”; LSJ, s.v. ἀρχηγός II.3: “first cause, originator 
κοπίδων”.
10 So Marcovich 1967/2001, 71.
11 Schol. Eur. Hek. 131 = DK 22 B 81.
12 Diog. Laert. 8, 8; Diels 1890.
13  For a challenging new interpretation which makes rhetoric and not Pythagoras the sole tar­
get of DK 22 B 81, see Vassallo 2015. Cf., however, Erbì 2010.
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e. g. Homer and Hesiod,14 does not seem conclusive: first, Heraclitus does not 
call the poets ‘liars’, secondly, ‘swindles’ most probably refers to the speeches of 
Pythagoras, who addressed his audience directly.
The tradition of Pythagoras’ speeches having been given to various groups of 
the Crotoniates is attested by the Socratic Antisthenes, and then by Dicaearchus 
(fr. 33) and Timaeus (ap. Iust. 20.4). In his comment on the Homeric epithet 
πολύτροπος, characterizing the wise and eloquent Odysseus, Antisthenes uses 
for comparison Pythagoras’ ability to speak differently with different social and 
age groups, such as women and children, for example, seeing in it proof of his 
wisdom (fr. 51 Decleva Caizzi). But Heraclitus, who had earned the nickname ‘the 
mob­reviler’ (ὀχλολοίδορος, Diog.  Laert. 9.6), was unlikely to admire a person 
trying to persuade his co­citizens of something, not least women and children. 
We know very little of the content of Pythagoras’ speeches, though one conspicu­
ous topic seemed to be the struggle with τρυφή and immoderation in general.15 
This attitude was not alien to Heraclitus himself, but there was no obstacle to 
him attacking people whose ideas he shared, whilst at the same time refusing 
to acknowledge their wisdom. In fact, we can only guess what specifically Hera­
clitus has in mind in condemning Pythagoras’ ‘swindles’. Though it is tempting 
to suggest here Pythagoras’ religious teaching, no classical source connects his 
speeches with anything religious. The fragment DK 22 B 28, “Justice will catch 
up with those who invent lies and those who swear to them”,16 which some com­
mentators relate to Pythagoras and his followers,17 seems too general in its claim 
to be convincingly connected either with metempsychosis or with Pythagoras. 
The two other fragments mentioning Pythagoras might clarify the background of 
Heraclitus’ criticism.
“Much learning does not teach understanding; otherwise it would have 
taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus”.18 This is 
fragment DK  22 B  40. Πολυμαθίη, which also figures in fragment DK  22 B  129, 
directed against Pythagoras alone, and the names, among which he is men­
tioned, show that the claims of Heraclitus are of an epistemological nature,19 as 
those related to Homer and Hesiod individually. Even if Hesiod knew most things 
(πλεῖστα εἰδέναι), he did not understand what he should have understood (DK 22 
14 Marcovich 1967/2001, 72–73.
15 Zhmud 2012, 93, 200 n. 120–121.
16 Trans. Charles H. Kahn.
17 Marcovich 1967/2001, 76–77; Conche 1986, 216.
18 Πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά 
τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον.
19 Marcovich 1967/2001, 59–60, 64–66; Conche 1986, 91–92.
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B 57). It is from this standpoint that Heraclitus juxtaposes the author of the The-
ogony and Pythagoras, Xenophanes, who ridiculed both traditional religion and 
metempsychosis (DK 21 B 7), and finally Hecataeus, also well known for his cri­
tique of common sense (FGrHist 1 F 1). Digressing from the distinctions between 
them, Heraclitus concentrates on what concerned him most of all: contrasting 
their method of cognition with his own. Since true insight was available only to 
Heraclitus, the others were left with πολυμαθίη alone.
There is a long dispute about πολυμαθίη: is it bad as such or just an insuffi­
cient means to attain wisdom? Those who prefer the second interpretation often 
refer to fragment DK  22 B  35: “Men who love wisdom must have knowledge of 
many things indeed”, which makes problematic condemnation of πολυμαθίη in 
itself.20 On the contrary, those who see incompatibility in these two fragments 
explain DK 22 B 35 as being an ironic sneer or as an opinion of οἱ πολλοί.21 In view 
of the other fragments, such as DK 22 B 55, which approves μάθησις, and DK 22 
B 95, which criticizes ἀμαθίη, one could say that Heraclitus does not condemn an 
active acquisition of knowledge per se, but contrasts πολυμαθίη with “the wise 
which is one”, ἓν τὸ σοφόν (DK 22 B 41; it is possible that B 40 and 41 were contin­
uous).22 This kind of wisdom is identified by Heraclitus with knowing the reason, 
or thought (γνώμη) that steers everything and is therefore accessible solely to him.
The other point of debate is the sequence of names in DK 22 B 40, divided by 
αὖτίς τε into two groups. Traditionally this was explained by chronology: when 
Heraclitus was writing, Hesiod and Pythagoras were no longer alive; hence their 
names are juxtaposed.23 Babut aptly noted that the name of Hesiod is placed at 
the head of the sentence, in an emphatic position, underlined by the placing of 
the verb, which separates it intentionally from the others:24 “Polymathie does 
not teach the intelligence of things, otherwise it is Hesiod whom it would have 
taught, and Pythagoras, to whom it is possible to add Xenophanes and Heca­ 
taeus”. In this rendering αὖτίς τε loses its function of dividing the four names 
into two opposing groups. In Heraclitus’ view, Hesiod’s poems, including the 
extensive genealogical Catalogue of Women, which was ascribed to him, made 
him the principal polymath, whereas Pythagoras’ success in the acquisition 
of knowledge, referred to in DK 22 B 129, brought him closer to Hesiod than to 
Xenophanes and Hecataeus.
20 See Lesher 1994, 15 n. 29 (with bibliography) and recently Vassallo 2015, 200–202.
21 See references in Marcovich 1967/2001, 27 and Granger 2004, 248–250.
22 Kirk 1970, 386–387; Babut 1976, 490–491; Marcovich 1967/2001, 449–453.
23 Lévy 1927, 2 n. 8; Marcovich 1967/2001, 64–65; Conche 1986, 92.
24 Babut 1976, 493–495.
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A different interpretation was put forward by W. Rathmann and W. Burkert: 
Pythagoras, with Hesiod, has to be treated as representing religious thought, 
unlike Xenophanes and Hecataeus.25 Recently this view was defended by H. 
Granger and C. Huffman: “Heraclitus pairs Pythagoras in B 40 with the ancient 
theologian Hesiod, and sets them apart from Xenophanes and Hecataeus who 
in their different ways try to abandon the irrationalities of Greek mythology”.26 
But did Pythagoras develop “non­Hesiodic mythical teaching about the world 
and its gods”27 that could be called πολυμαθίη and compared to the Theogony of 
Hesiod or the Genealogies of Hecataeus?28 The fourth­century tradition ascribes 
to him claims to remember his previous incarnations, predict future events and 
understand the language of animals (Arist. fr. 191), but these stories – if they were 
already known to Heraclitus29 – relate to Pythagoras’ superhuman and extraor­
dinary qualities, which would rather separate him from the other polymaths. 
Besides, we should bear in mind that unlike Xenophanes, Hecataeus and Heracli­
tus himself, Pythagoras did not say anything new about gods, whereas his teach­
ing on the immortality and transmigration of the soul was no less innovative and 
‘modern’, for example, in its attitude to animal sacrifice, than Xenophanes’ view 
on a single non­anthropomorphic deity. The examples of Empedocles and Plato 
demonstrate that it can be easily integrated into philosophical theology.
What brings Xenophanes and Hecataeus together is their openly critical atti­
tude towards the tradition, a characteristic that is not associated with Pythagoras, 
though he too belonged to the reformers of the traditional Greek religion. As for 
Heraclitus, his position is far from a clear­cut dichotomy between ‘religion’ and 
‘Ionian rationalism’. On the one hand, he ignored Anaximander and Anaximenes 
and attacked Xenophanes and Hecataeus, on the other, his criticism of Homer 
and Hesiod did not concern mythology as such; he questioned their wisdom and 
insight, not that they were not enlightened enough. What was most objectionable 
about Hesiod? The fact that he did not recognize that day and night are one (DK 22 
B 57). No Greek thinker, however rationalistic he might have been, could have 
25 Rathmann 1933, 38; Burkert 1972, 210. Rathmann’s general approach to Pythagoras was hy­
percritical, he even disputed the tradition that Pythagoras taught metempsychosis.
26 Granger 2004, 246. Huffman 2008, 22: “Pythagoras belongs not to the new world of Ionian 
rationalism represented by Xenophanes and Hecataeus but rather to the mythological view of 
the world found in Hesiod”.
27 Burkert 1972, 210.
28 Cf. Kahn 2001, 16: “There is no reason to suppose that the great learning ascribed to Pytha­
goras is limited to theological genealogy in the style of Hesiod”.
29 Some of them were invented later or transferred from Pherecydes to Pythagoras: Zhmud 2012, 
62–63.
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escaped that kind of criticism. Heraclitus’ general attitude towards traditional 
religion is a matter of controversy, as is almost everything in his oeuvre, but two 
special studies of this problem, by D. Babut and M. Adomenas, though coming 
to quite different conclusions, both stress the same point: Heraclitus was neither 
a reformer of the Greek religion nor an Aufklärer.30 It is doubtful, therefore, that 
a distinction between ‘mythology’ (which, incidentally, does not appear as such 
in the preserved fragments as opposed to the various religious practices) and 
‘Ionian rationalism’ was that relevant for him in DK 22 B 40.
It is easy to foresee that Pythagoras’ wisdom was also not of the kind accept­
able to Heraclitus. In fragment DK 22 B 129 we read: “Pythagoras, the son of Mne­
sarchus, practised inquiry beyond all other men and having selected these writ­
ings made a wisdom of his own: much learning, an imposture”.31 Here polymathie 
is what really constitutes Pythagoras’ wisdom, which, in turn, was attained by 
ἱστορίη and the usage of books. Thus, the contours of Pythagoras’ figure, as they 
were known to Heraclitus, become more visible to us: he was famous for his 
wisdom, vast knowledge and intensive intellectual activity. Indeed, what espe­
cially distinguishes Pythagoras in Heraclitus’ eyes from all the other men is the 
intensiveness of ἱστορίη he has undertaken. ἱστορίη appears only once in Her­
aclitus, though the above­quoted fragment, χρὴ γὰρ εὖ μάλα πολλῶν ἵστορας 
φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας εἶναι (DK 22 B 35), connects ἱστορίη with an accumulation of 
knowledge by those who love wisdom. Over the last century ἱστορίη has usually 
been rendered as ‘Forschung’, ‘scientific research’ or more neutrally as ‘Erkund­
ung’, ‘inquiry’.32 In any event, ἱστορίη remains a purposeful cognitive activity of 
a rational kind, but in order to understand what specifically it refers to we must 
compare it with Pythagoras’ activities.
In itself, ἱστορίη does not necessarily mean “natural science”, asserts 
Huffman, and περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία as the standard designation of the Presocratic 
30 Babut 1975, 121: “L’attitude d’Heraclite est donc aussi éloignée que possible de celle d’un 
réformateur religieux, dont le but serait de corriger certains aspects choquants des croyances ou 
des pratiques usuelles: en s’appuyant sur deux exemples particulièrement significatifs – sacri­
fices expiatoires et prières représentent en effet deux aspects essentiels du culte traditionnel – 
c’est en réalité toute la religiosité populaire qu’il condamne d’un seul coup”. Adomenas 1999, 
113 : “Heraclitus, on the contrary, is not a reformer or an Aufklärer, but an interpreter who tries 
to discern the pattern inherent in the existing practices, and exploit it in the construction of his 
own philosophical theology”.
31 Πυθαγόρης Μνησάρχου ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος 
ταύτας τὰς συγγραφὰς ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ σοφίην, πολυμαθίην, κακοτεχνίην.
32 So e. g. Zeller 1910, 459 n. 4: “Erkundigung, Nachfragen bei andern”; Riedweg 2005, 50: “the 
desire to see, hear, and learn from others”. Cf. Marcovich 1967/2001, 68: “scientific inquiry (or 
research)”; Robinson 1987, 73: “‘art of’ investigation”.
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natural philosophy/science appears only in the late fifth century.33 This is correct, 
yet the first option for being the main area of Pythagoras’ inquiry is not natural 
science, but rather mathemata, as is attested in Aristotle’s fragment, which 
resembles in its structure fragment DK 22 B 129 of Heraclitus: “Pythagoras, the 
son of Mnesarchus, first dedicated himself to the study of mathemata, especially 
numbers, but later could not refrain from the wonder­working of Pherecydes” (fr. 
191).34 Indeed, it was geometry and (mathematical) astronomy, where Thales and 
Anaximander attained their greatest success (in Thales’ case this was attested by 
Heraclitus: DK 22 B 38), and there is ample evidence both that these sciences were 
cultivated in the early Pythagorean school and that arithmetic and harmonics 
were added to them.35 We can live without Pythagoras the natural philosopher, 
who is hardly perceptible behind the theories even of his immediate followers, 
Alcmaeon and Hippasus. But without his contributions arithmetic, geometry, 
mathematical astronomy and harmonics of the early fifth century are left hanging 
in the air. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that mathemata constituted a signifi­
cant part of Pythagoras’ inquiry, or research.
Granger interprets Heraclitus’ attitude to everything in which Pythagoras 
was involved in a resolutely negative way. Polymathie as such is uncondition­
ally condemned by Heraclitus, and Pythagoras’ polymathie specifically lies in 
extensive borrowing from Greek folk wisdom and superstition, exemplified in 
the Pythagorean symbola (Granger prefers to call them akousmata, though this 
term appears only in Iamblichus). Further, ἱστορίη in Heraclitus’ eyes is no less 
objectionable than πολυμαθίη, and his words about “philosophical men” who 
are obliged to be “inquirers” into many things (DK 22 B 35) are just a mockery 
of “those parvenus like Pythagoras who pursue ‘inquiry’”. Pythagoras’ ἱστορίη 
amounts merely to his pursuit of books, whereas his wisdom is a compilation 
of opinions, based on hearsay and book­learning.36 Huffman develops some of 
these ideas, especially that of the symbola as the principal result of Pythagoras’ 
ἱστορίη. In order to resolve the contradiction between the hearsay learning of 
Pythagoras and his study of books, he offers several new interpretations. Thus, 
having analyzed in detail the usage of ἱστορίη in Herodotus, the nearest source to 
Heraclitus, Huffman comes to the conclusion that it means “the active collection 
33 Huffman 2008, 23–24. See Pl. Phd. 96a. Eur. fr. 910 N.
34 Cf. Xenocrates fr. 87 Isnardi Parente: “Pythagoras, Xenocrates says, discovered also that the 
intervals in music do not come into being apart from number, for they are an interrelation of 
quantity with quantity. So he set out to investigate under what conditions concordant intervals 
come about, and discordant ones, and everything well attuned and ill attuned”.
35 Zhmud 2012, 239–345.
36 Granger 2004, 241–250.
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of what people say on a given topic”. Respectively, “Herodotean usage suggests 
that Heraclitus’ audience would have understood him to be saying that Pythago­
ras was actively engaged in collecting what people say on a number of topics, in 
making enquiries, and that he created his wisdom out of this hearsay evidence.”37 
(Probably in order to underline the oral character of Pythagoras’ ἱστορίη Huffman 
renders it throughout his paper invariably as ‘enquiry’, even in all those cases, 
where the scholarly texts he quotes have ‘inquiry’.38 This is hardly a matter of 
personal preference, for I did not find ‘enquiry’ in any other English translation 
of DK 22 B 129.) Now, Herodotus was necessarily engaged in what we call today 
‘oral history’ and his usage of the written sources was very limited, indeed. It is 
only natural that his practice of ἱστορίη consisted often in asking other people 
what they know, though he himself preferred to be an eyewitness. This does not 
mean, however, that Heraclitus, who wrote earlier, meant by ἱστορίην ἤσκησεν 
ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων that Pythagoras was taking a poll of people’s opinion 
(on what subject?) more than all other men. This is improbable in itself and 
would contradict the entire fifth­century tradition which unanimously stresses 
Pythagoras’ σοφία: a wise man, whether a religious sage or philosopher, does not 
need to collect hearsay evidence. It is another thing to accuse a famous wise man 
of his wisdom being derived from συγγραφαί and being in fact nothing more than 
polymathie.39
In order to progress we must work out what συγγραφαί Heraclitus could have 
had in mind. συγγραφή normally indicates a prose writing (LSJ, s.v. II.1),40 so 
that Orphic poems, suggested by Rathmann,41 seem out of place here. Huffman 
attempted to prove that συγγραφή could mean poetry as well, but adduces no 
example from the classical literature where συγγραφή refers to poetry and only 
one, of the mid­fourth century, where σύγγραμμα explicitly refers to both prosaic 
and poetic works.42 His analysis of Herodotean usage does not support his con­
clusion that “[i]n Herodotus too, a συγγραφή turns out to be something recorded 
37 Huffman 2008, 31, 33.
38 Most modern British dictionaries define ‘enquiry’ as ‘the act of questioning’ and ‘inquiry’ as 
‘investigation’.
39 At the same time, we should not forget “that Heraclitus had practiced inquiry the way Pytha­
goras had, or was a well read person” (Mansfeld 1990, 445).
40 Marcovich 1967/2001, 69; Kahn 1979, 113; Conche, 1986, 106.
41 Rathmann 1933, 93; Burkert 1972, 131, 210.
42 Pl. Leg. 858d; Huffman 2008, 36–38. His example with συγγράφω in Aristotle (EE  1214a1–
4) proves the opposite, for here Aristotle first says that someone composed an inscription 
(συνέγραψεν) for the propylaeum of the temple of Leto, then conveys its content, and finally 
quotes it, introducing the verses with ποιήσας.
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in writing, but it is clear that the writing can be either in prose or in verse”.43 The 
only example of συγγραφή (Hdt. 1.93) refers to ‘recording’ or ‘writing down’ the 
marvels of Lydia (see LSJ, s.v. I), whereas συγγράφω in those two cases where it 
is related to the oracles in verses (Hdt. 1.47–48; 7.141) obviously means ‘to write 
or note down’ (LSJ, s.v. I) and not ‘to compose a work in writing, especially in 
prose’ (LSJ, s.v. II). The verses were composed not by those envoys who wrote 
them down.44 Since ταύτας τὰς συγγραφάς in DK 22 B 129 denote rather ‘written 
compositions, books’ than just something which was ‘written down’ but com­
posed by the other people, this seriously limits the possibilities of seeing in them 
religious poetry. Among the prose writings that we know of the only one with 
religious content is that of Pythagoras’ alleged teacher Pherecydes; the others 
are either of a philosophical nature, such as the treatises of Anaximander and 
Anaximenes, or devoted to special fields of knowledge. To this category belong 
technical treatises by the architects Chersiphron and Metagenes of Crete and The­
odorus of Samos, the work on music by Lasus of Hermione, the interpretation of 
the Homeric poems by Theagenes of Rhegium, the voyages of Scylax of Caryanda 
and Euthymenes of Massalia.45 Kahn rightly points out that this is only a small 
portion of what existed in the sixth century.46
Indeed, Thales’ geometry must have reached Italy in a written form, even if 
we do not have direct evidence for this. It is worth recalling, however, that Aris­
totle’s student Eudemus of Rhodes says in his History of Geometry that Thales 
“was the first to notice and assert that in every isosceles the angles at the base are 
equal, though in somewhat archaic fashion he called the ‘equal’ angles ‘similar’” 
(ἀρχαϊκώτερον δὲ τὰς ἴσας ὁμοίας προσειρηκέναι).47 Obviously, Eudemus relied 
on an early geometrical text, at least earlier than Hippocrates of Chios (ca. 
430 BC), who called the equal angles ἴσας,48 where theorems attributed to Thales 
43 Huffman 2008, 40.
44 Contrary to Huffman’s contention (2008, 40), most of the oracles were written not in verses 
but in prose, as was convincingly demonstrated by J. Fontenrose (1978, 174, 193–195).
45 Technical treatises (Vitr. VII, praef. 12); Lasus (18 A  3; Aristox. Harm. 7.19 f.); Theagenes 
(8 A 2); Scylax (FGrHist 709); Euthymenes (FHG IV, 408).
46 Kahn 2003, 152.
47 Procl. in Eucl. 251.2, trans. Glenn R. Morrow. The Eudemian origin of these words is widely 
accepted; for references see Panchenko (1994) 37 n. 25. In the case of Oenopides of Chios (ca 450) 
Eudemus was also sensitive to problems of terminology: Oenopides calls the perpendicular in 
the archaic manner gnomon­wise (ὀνομάζει δὲ τὴν κάθετον ἀρχαϊκῶς κατὰ γνώμωνα), since the 
gnomon also stands at right angles to the horizon (Procl. in Eucl. 283.7 f.). See Zhmud (2006), 
171, 200.
48 Fr. 140, p. 60. 6 Wehrli. See Panchenko 1994, 37 ff.
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were written down. Eudemus refers to four of them.49 Such or a similar text could 
have been available to Heraclitus too. On the other hand, there is no reason to 
suppose that Heraclitus had in mind Babylonian mathematical treatises,50 for 
who would call συγγραφαί the small clay tablets with absolutely unintelligible 
signs on them?
ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς σύγγραφάς seems to mean ‘having selected these 
writings’ rather than ‘having selected from (or of) these writings’,51 while ταύτας 
may refer to something outside of the fragment. Huffman, following M. West, 
takes ταύτας to indicate that the συγγραφάς were notorious in some way. Further, 
though he suggests that “Heraclitus could have used συγγραφαί to refer to any­
thing written up, whether in poetry or in prose”,52 it is not religious poetry that 
he finds in the συγγραφαί. Relying mainly on the late fifth and early fourth cen­
turies’ Athenian usage of συγγραφή as decree, covenant, contract, bond etc. (LSJ, 
s.v. II.2), he argues that Heraclitus more likely was referring not to book­length 
writings or treatises but to “short records of information of some sort”. It turns 
out, then, that these συγγραφαί could be even one sentence long, in which case it 
is easy to identify them with the Pythagorean sayings known as symbola.
The following picture develops: Pythagoras widely travels asking different 
authorities about various important things  – What is an earthquake? What is 
wisest? Should we walk on public roads?, – memorizes their answers – that an 
earthquake is a gathering of the dead, that the wisest is the number and that we 
should not walk on public roads – then somebody else writes up a collection of 
these symbola and thus they become the συγγραφαί referred to by Heraclitus. 
“Heraclitus may be saying something like this to his reader”, writes Huffman: 
“‘You know these things of Pythagoras that have been written up and are in cir­
culation – he just selected them out of his extensive enquiries into the views of 
other people.’”53
All this, however, is not convincing. συγγραφή cannot mean a saying of one 
sentence long; any decree or marriage contract, however short, constitutes a 
complete text. An oral σύμβολον which is written up remains a σύμβολον and 
does not become a συγγραφή.54 The earliest collection of the symbola that we 
49 Zhmud (2006), 170, 191 f.
50 Marcovich 1967/2001, 69.
51 DK 22 B 129; Kahn 1979, 309 n. 79; Barnes 1982, 146; Robinson 1987, 73; Huffman 2008, 35.
52  Huffman 2008, 41.
53 Huffman 2008, 43.
54 Cf. the symbola on the fourth century BC Orphic tablet: σύμβολα. Ἀν<δ>ρικεπαιδόθυρσον. 
Ἀνδρικεπαιδόθυρσον. Βριμώ. Βριμώ. εἴσιθ<ι> ἱερὸν λειμῶνα. ἄποινος γὰρ ὁ μύστης (Bernabé 
2005, 72, fr. 493).
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know of was compiled around 400 BC by a Milesian Sophist Anaximander the 
Younger, and its Pythagorean origin is guarantied only by its title, Συμβόλων 
Πυθαγορείων ἐξήγησις (58 C  6).55 But even in Anaximander these sayings are 
called the Pythagorean, not Pythagoras’ symbola. Indeed, not a single symbolon 
from Anaximander’s collection preserved by Aristotle (fr. 194–195) was related 
to Pythagoras in the fifth­century tradition. This makes the existence of a collec­
tion of the symbola written in the time of Heraclitus and available only to him 
highly improbable. Nothing that we know of early Pythagoreanism allows us to 
assume the existence of any authoritative religious text emanating from Pythago­
ras.56 And how would Heraclitus recognise that the συγγραφαί, which constitute 
the results of Pythagoras’ ἱστορίη and the essence of his wisdom, are written by 
somebody else, since Pythagoras – as we know – did not write anything?
I now come to σοφίη. Heraclitus asserts that the wisdom of Pythagoras 
achieved through research and the accumulation of knowledge from books 
is no less seeming than the wisdom of Homer. In reality it is πολυμαθίη and 
κακοτεχνίη. But if we look at it against the background of the entire early tra­
dition, Pythagoras’ σοφία becomes his most conspicuous trait. It is noted by 
Herodotus (4.95) and Empedocles (DK 31 B 129), the philosophising poet Ion of 
Chios (DK 36 B 40), Antisthenes (fr. 51 Decleva Caizzi) and the Sophist Alcida­
mas (DK 14 A 5). Especially close to Heraclitus’s words is Ion’s elegy to Pherecy­
des, who “even in death has a life which is pleasing to his soul, if Pythagoras the 
wise truly achieved knowledge and understanding beyond that of all men” (εἴπερ 
Πυθαγόρης ἐτύμως σοφός, ὃς περὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων γνώμας εἶδε καὶ ἐξέμαθεν, 
DK 36 B 4, trans. Kenneth Dover).57 Often these words are seen as a polemic with 
Heraclitus, defending Pythagoras’ wisdom.58 The context of most other testimo­
nies is similar: they point to the outstanding intellectual abilities of Pythagoras 
and his vast knowledge. It makes no sense to argue against this knowledge being 
connected with the sphere of religion; what is important to us is that it was not 
restricted to that sphere. Neither the miracles of Pythagoras nor his preaching of 
metempsychosis could alone establish his reputation as a wise man.
ἱστορίη, συγγραφαί, σοφίη and πολυμαθίη taken together imply that Pytha­
goras’ κακοτεχνίη should be at the same theoretical level, whereas κοπίδες in 
DK 22 B 81 refer rather to his social activities. The usual meaning of κακοτεχνίη is 
55 See Zhmud 2012, 192–206.
56 Burkert 1972, 219–220.
57 See Dover 1988. For the meaning of γνώμη, cf. Heraclitus DK 22 B 41 and 78; Anaxagoras 
DK 59 B 12; Democritus DK 68 B 11. Snell 1924, 31–32 stresses the double meaning of γνώμη as 
cognition and its result.
58 See e. g. Marcovich 1967/2001, 67–68; Dover 1988, 4–5.
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‘base artifice, falsification, charlatanism’; the legal sense is ‘bribing of a witness 
to give false testimony evidence’ (LSJ, s.v.), which is to say something connected 
with fraud. By itself κακοτεχνίη nowhere implies religious imposture, so Burkert’s 
suggestion to see here “a ritually enacted katabasis of Pythagoras” did not win 
much support.59 Huffman proposes a rather gloomy interpretation of κακοτεχνίη: 
it refers “to the Pythagorean society as a conspiracy, which is based on false tes­
timony about the Pythagorean doctrine of the immortality and transmigration of 
the soul”.60 I doubt very much that any reader of Heraclitus could extract from 
κακοτεχνίη such a meaning. Certainly, Pythagoras’ claims of immortality and an 
ability to do wonders could not have been to Heraclitus’ liking, but the Pythag­
orean society was a political organisation, and no Pythagorean known to us by 
name is connected with transmigration of the soul. There were suggestions that 
κακοτεχνίη is an accusation of appropriation of the thoughts of others, but I am 
not sure that we can narrow down the general meaning of this word in DK 22 B 129 
with certainty.61 At any rate, whatever specific meaning Heraclitus imparted to 
κακοτεχνίη, it provides only an additional nuance to his radical denial of any 
significance one should attach to everything said by his archrival Pythagoras of 
Samos.
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Abstract
Heraclitus is known for his critical attitude towards his predecessors. Almost 
every author mentioned by him – Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus, Xenophanes 
and Hecataeus – attract their share of opprobrium. Among the early Greek think­
ers only Thales seemed to appear in a neutral context (DK 22 B 38). Judging by the 
preserved evidence, Pythagoras was the principal target of Heraclitus’ attacks, 
for the Samian sage is mentioned in three different fragments, every time very 
crucially. In DK  22 B  129 Heraclitus claims that Pythagorasʼ wisdom is in fact 
a polymathy and an imposture, B  40 says that Pythagorasʼ polymathy did not 
teach him understanding (νόον), and B 81 calls Pythagoras “originator, ancestor 
of swindles”. The force of Heraclitusʼ attacks on Pythagoras demonstrates that 
he possibly saw in him his chief rival, but how this has to be explained? What 
was the area in which their interests and competences have crossed? Heracli­
tus was the first to note the dual nature of the figure of Pythagoras, cf. ἱστορίη 
and κακοτεχνίη in DK 22 B 129. On what evidence did he rely? This article tries to 
answer these and several related questions.

